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The Environmental Liability of Lenders in England:
Is the Tide Coming in?
Jonathan H. Marks*
I. Introduction
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the ebb
and flow of legislative and judicial activity in the United States
has raised important issues regarding the potential exposure of
lenders to environmental liability.1 Although such activity has
* Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London; currently Visiting Lecturer at Princeton
University.
This article is a revision of a chapter, which appears in a book entitled BANKS,
LIABILrrY AND RISK (William Blair QC ed., 3d ed. 2001) published by LLP, a division of
Informa UK Ltd. I am grateful to LLP for kindly giving me permission to publish this
article.
I am indebted to Professors Lissa Lamkin Broome and Donald Hornstein for their
comments on and assistance with the references to lender liability in the United States. I
am grateful to them and to all the other faculty, staff, and students at the University of
North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, who made my two visits during the
academic year 2000-2001 so rewarding.
I Lenders' concern arose from the imposition of liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorisation Act of 1986 (SARA),
referred to collectively as "the Superfund legislation," 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980)
(amended 1986). Under that legislation, cleanup costs are recoverable from an "owner or
operator," 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), the definition of which excludes a "person, who without
participating in the management of a facility, holds the indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility" ("the secured creditor exemption"),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). However, the broad approach adopted by some courts as to the
meaning of management participation caused particular concern. See United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990). Although the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) tried to clarify the position in 1992 by formulating a lender
liability rule, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan;
Lender Liability under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,368 (Apr. 29, 1992) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992)), this rule was struck down on the grounds that the
USEPA had no authority to enact such a rule and that it was for the courts to interpret the
secured creditor exemption. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The USEPA
and the Department of Justice responded to this decision by issuing a joint statement in
1995 affirming their intention "to follow the provisions of the Lender Liability Rule as
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created a few ripples in England, the water there has generally
been a great deal calmer. As a result, some lenders might assume
that the risks of environmental liability being imposed under
English law are illusory rather than real. This article seeks to
identify and analyze realistic risks to lenders and to provide
guidance as to how such risks should be assessed and their
materialization avoided.2
This article is divided into three parts.3 The first part considers
the potential grounds upon which a lender might incur
environmental liability under English law.4 A detailed analysis of
all the common law and statutory regimes that might impose such
liability is not within the scope of this article.5 However, attention
is focused on the statutory provisions that present the most
material risks to lenders, and, in particular, on the new
contaminated land regime. For the purpose of this discussion, the
potential grounds of liability are divided into two categories that
cut across both civil and criminal liability.
(a) Liability imposed on a lender as a result of the lender's
active or passive participation in the chain of causation, which
enforcement policy." CERCLA Enforcement Against Lenders and Government Entities
that Acquire Property Involuntarily, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517, 63,518 (Dec. 11, 1995).
Greater certainty was introduced in 1996 by an amendment to the secured creditor
exemption, which is discussed later in this article. See infra note 149. For a summary of
the position in the United States, see Ron Burke, Sailing in Safe Harbors: Recent
Developments Regarding Lender Liability under CERCLA, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 143
(1998).
2 See infra notes 114-145 and accompanying text.
3 In this article the following acronyms are used: "EPA 1990"-Environmental
Protection Act, 1990, c. 43 (Eng.), "EA 1995"-The Environmental Act, 1995, c. 25
(Eng.), "WRA"-Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57 (Eng.).
4 See infra notes 11-113 and accompanying text. The citation of English cases in
this article is in the format prescribed by the law report in which the case is published.
Additional information such as the level of the court and the year in which the decision
was made (where this is different from the year of the report) are provided in parentheses
after the citation.
5 Readers in search of such an analysis may wish to consult a specialist work such
as STEPHEN TROMANS & ROBERT TURRALL-CLARKE, CONTAMINATED LAND (1994)
(which should be read in conjunction with STEPHEN TROMANS & ROBERT TURRALL-
CLARKE, CONTAMINATED LAND: FIRST SUPPLEMENT (1999) and STEPHEN TROMANS &
ROBERT TURRALL-CLARKE, CONTAMINATED LAND: A NEW REGIME: PART IIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT 1990 (2000) [hereinafter THE NEW REGIME]). See
also GARNER'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (D.J. Harris et al. eds., 2001).
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resulted in the pollution concerned. Such liability is referred to
here as "participatory liability."6
(b) Liability imposed on a lender arising out of the lender's
rights of ownership or occupation of property. Such rights
ordinarily arise as a result of security taken by the lender. Liability
imposed in these circumstances is referred to here as "proprietary
liability."7
The second part of this article examines the potential
consequences of environmental liability for recovery by a lender
and, in particular, its effect on the value of any security and on the
borrower's covenant to repay.8
The third part considers steps that may be taken to reduce the
probability of a lender's economic or proprietary interests being
adversely affected by the imposition of environmental liability. 9
Particular attention is paid to making preliminary inquiries,
drafting loan and security documentation and enforcing
repayment. ,0
II. The Potential Grounds of Lender Liability
A. Participatory Liability
1. Causing
Several regimes impose liability for "causing or knowingly
permitting" pollution.1' A useful starting point for the analysis of
6 See infra notes 11-77 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 78-113 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 121-145 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 121-145 and accompanying text.
Wi ater Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85(1) (Eng.). Other regimes include:
(a) Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, §§ 161(A)-(D) (Eng.), pursuant to
which a person who caused or knowingly permitted polluting matter to
enter controlled waters may be served with a notice requiring him to carry
out anti-pollution works;
(b) the new contaminated land regime, which is discussed further below.
See Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78A-78YC (Eng.); infra
note 44; and
(c) section 33 of the EPA 1990, which prohibits (inter alia) the deposit of
controlled waste in or on land except in accordance with a waste
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
such liability is section 85(1) of the WRA. This section provides
that a person may be guilty of an offense if, in the absence of
consent, he "causes or knowingly permits any poisonous, noxious
or polluting matter or any solid waste matter to enter any
controlled waters."' 2 Before considering the application of this
provision to a lender, it is necessary to examine briefly the general
scope of the liability imposed.
Liability for "causing" is strict in that "it does not require mens
rea in the sense of intention or negligence."'' 3 In Alphacell v.
Woodward14 Lord Wilberforce stated: "[C]ausing... must involve
some active operation or chain of operations involving as the
result the pollution of the stream .... In my opinion, "causing"
here must be given a common sense meaning and I deprecate the
introduction of refinements, such as causa causans, effective
cause or novus actus."'15
One or more persons may cause pollution by carrying out
separate and distinct acts, each of which contributes to the
pollution, and without any of which the pollution would not have
occurred. 16 In Environment Agency v. Empress Car Co., Lord
Hoffmann stated that "[t]he only question was whether something
which the defendant had done, whether immediately or
antecedently, had caused the pollution."' 1
7
management licence and provides that a person shall not "knowingly cause
or knowingly permit" such a deposit.
12 Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85(1) (Eng.).
13 Env't Agency v. Empress Cars Co., [1992] 2 A.C. 22, 32 (H.L.). See also
Alphacell v. Woodward, [1972] 1 A.C. 824, 842 (H.L.).
14 [1972] 1 A.C. 824.
15 Id. at 834.
16 Attomey-Gen.'s Reference (No. 1 of 1994), [1995] 1 W.L.R. 599, 613-14 (C.A.
1994). See also Env't Agency v. Empress Car Co., [1999] 2 A.C. 22, 30 (H.L.), in which
Lord Hoffmann said that the court should not ask, "What caused the pollution?" because
that question may have a number of correct answers; the proper question was, "For the
purpose of section 85(1) [of the WRA], 'Did the defendant cause the pollution?'
17 Empress Car Co., [1999] 2 A.C. at 28. Lord Hoffman criticized the suggestion in
Price v. Cromack, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 988, 993-94 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1975), and Wychavon
Dist. Council v. Nat'l Rivers Auth., [1993] 1 W.L.R. 125, 134-36 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1993),
that there must be a positive act by the defendant which was the immediate cause of the
escape. Id. See also Nat'l Rivers Auth. v. Yorkshire Water, [1995] 1 A.C. 444, 452-53
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), and Attorney-Gen.'s Reference (No. 1 of 1994), [1995]
1 W.L.R. 599, 614-15 (C.A.), in which the court similarly refused to accept that there
[Vol. 27
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In order to answer the question, "Did the defendant cause
pollution?" Lord Hoffmann said that:
[O]ne cannot give a common sense answer to a question of
causation for the purpose of attributing responsibility under
some rule without knowing the purpose and scope of the rule.
Does the rule impose a duty which requires one to guard against,
or makes one responsible for, the deliberate acts of third
persons?1
8
The mere provision of financial assistance should not
ordinarily be considered an "active operation" in the chain of
causation for the purpose of the approach adopted by Lord
Wilberforce in Alphacell.'9 Alternatively, adopting the approach of
Lord Hoffmann in Empress Car Co., one could argue that the
purpose of the Act2" was not to require lenders to guard against or
to be responsible for the acts of the borrower.2'
It is extremely unlikely that a lender would find itself liable for
"causing" pollution simply by funding the polluting operations of
the borrower or by withdrawing a facility in accordance with its
terms when the monies might otherwise have been used to fund
remedial work. However, a lender is likely to be at risk where it is
involved in the management of the borrower's business and/or
22exercises control over its daily operations.
2. Knowingly Permitting
In Alphacell, Lord Wilberforce made it clear that "knowingly
was any further requirement of such a positive act.
18 Empress Car Co., [1999] 2 A.C. at 28. When the statute does make the
defendant responsible for the acts of third persons, the liability of the defendant will
depend upon whether the act of the third party should be regarded as ordinary or a
"normal fact of life" (in which case the defendant will be liable) or as extraordinary (in
which case he will not). Id. at 32.
19 [1972] 1 A.C. 824, 834 (H.L.) Examples of active operation might be the
"maintaining of a system, the carrying on of an enterprise [or] the management of a
going concern." Empress Car Co., [1999) 2 A.C. at 37.
20 Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85(1) (Eng.).
21 See Lord Hoffmann's approach to the construction of section 85(1) of the WRA,
which he had taken in regard to the policy of the Act. Empress Car Co., [1999] 2 A.C. at
32-35.
22 For examples of the matters that might lead to such control, see the discussion of
shadow directors, see infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
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permitting . . . involves a failure to prevent the pollution . . .
accompanied by knowledge., 23 Again, it is useful to consider the
scope of these requirements before considering their application to
lenders.
The requirement of knowledge raises two important issues.
First, to which elements of the offense does the requirement of
knowledge relate? The answer to this question depends upon the
construction of the relevant statutory provision.24 It is therefore
impossible to provide an answer of uniform application. In relation
to section 85 of the WRA, it is arguable that knowledge that the
relevant matter is poisonous, noxious, or polluting and knowledge
that it is entering controlled waters are both required.25
Second, when will a defendant be held to have constructive
knowledge of the relevant elements of the offence? The approach
of the courts to this issue may reduce the importance of the first
issue. In Westminster v. Croyalgrange26 Lord Bridge said:
[I]t is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge on
the part of a defendant is required to be proved, to base a finding
of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had deliberately
shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from inquiry because he
suspected the truth but did not want to have his suspicion
confirmed.
23 Alphacell, [1972) 1 A.C. at 834.
24 See Shanks McEwan v. Env't Agency, [1999] Q.B. 333, 342-45 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.
1997) (in which it was held that for the purpose of section 33(1)(a) of the EPA 1990, the
requirement of knowledge related only to the deposit of the waste and not whether the
deposit was made in accordance with a waste management license); Ashcroft v. Cambro,
[1981] 1 W.L.R. 1349 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1981) (in which it was held that for the purpose of
section 3(1)(a) of the Control of Pollution Act of 1974, chapter 40, the requirement of
knowledge related only to the deposit of waste and not whether such deposit was in
breach of a condition of a waste disposal license). Cf. Westminster v. Croyalgrange,
[1986] 1 W.L.R. 674, 681-82, 684 (H.L.) (in which it was held that, for the purpose of
the Local Government (Misc. Provisions) Act of 1982, chapter 30, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant knew both that his property was being used as a sex
establishment and also that such use was not in accordance with the terms of a license
granted under the Act).
25 See Schulman's Inc. v. Nat'l Rivers Auth., CO/1372/90, 1991 Q.B. LEXIS
(Crown Office List Dec. 3, 1991); Regina v. Hallam, [1957] 1 Q.B. 569, 573 (C.A.).
26 [1986] 1 W.L.R. 674.
27 Id. at 684. See also Schulman's Inc., CO/1372/90, 1991 Q.B. LEXIS (Crown
Office List Dec. 3, 1991).
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In light of the court's approach to constructive knowledge, a
lender is unlikely to be acting in its own best interests if it seeks to
avoid any exploration of potential pollution or environmental
liabilities.
Not only must knowledge of the pollution be established under
section 85(1) of the WRA, 28 but it must also be demonstrated that
the pollution was permitted by the lender. Before being held to
have permitted pollution, it is suggested that a lender must (1)
possess the power to prevent the pollution and (2) fail to take
reasonable steps to exercise that power.29 In the ordinary course of
events, it is unlikely that a lender would be considered to possess
the necessary power to prevent a borrower from polluting.3"
However, if a lender exercises control over the day-to-day
operations of the borrower, there is a risk that it would be
perceived as possessing such a power.
An examination of the English authorities that consider the
liability of shadow directors3' is helpful in discerning when a
lender may or may not be found liable for causing or knowingly
permitting. 32 This is because a person is similarly at risk of being
28 Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57 (Eng.).
29 In Berton v. Alliance Econ. Invs., [1922] 1 K.B. 742, 759, Atkin L.J. said that
"the word 'permit' means one of two things, either to give leave for an act which without
that leave could not be legally done, or to abstain from taking reasonable steps to prevent
the act where it is within a man's power to prevent it." The first meaning is reiterated in
Tophams v. Sefton, [1967] 1 A.C. 50, 75 (H.L.), in which Lord Upjohn said that the word
'permit' connoted the necessity (in order to undertake a proposed course of action
lawfully) to ask and obtain permission from a party who had the right to refuse. The
second meaning is reflected in the decision of the Divisional Court in Schulman's Inc.,
CO/1372/90, 1991 Q.B. LEXIS (Crown Office List Dec. 3, 1991), in which convictions
for knowingly permitting the pollution of controlled waters were overturned because
there was no evidence that the appellant could have prevented such pollution.
30 See, e.g., Berton, [1922] 1 K.B. 759, in which Atkin L.J. said (in the context of
covenants in a lease) that "acts of sympathy or assistance" which fall short of the two
meanings of 'permit,' supra note 29, do not amount to permission.
31 In Re Hydrocam (Corby) Ltd., [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180, 183, Millett J. (as he then
was) described a shadow director as someone who "does not claim or purport to act as a
director" but who "lurks in the shadows, sheltering behind others who, he claims, are the
only directors of the company to the exclusion of himself." More recently, however, in
Sec. of State for Trade v. Deverell, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 907, 920 (C.A.), Morritt L.J. said
that a person may be held to be a shadow director even though he takes no steps to hide
the part which he plays in the affairs of the company.
32 It is by no means clear that the English courts would adopt the same test in order
to establish the environmental liability of lenders. However, in the absence of clear and
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held liable as a shadow director of a company if he exercises
control over the management of that company.33
For example, in ex p Copp,34 a bank commissioned a report on
the affairs of a corporate customer from its own financial services
section.35 The company then took various steps to implement the
recommendations contained in the report.36 Knox J. held the
argument that the bank had acted as a shadow director was not
"obviously unsustainable."37 At trial, however, the judge observed
that the allegation was "rightly abandoned," implying that this was
due to the absence of supporting oral evidence.38
In Re Tasbian (No.3)3 9 the Court of Appeal held that there was
an arguable case4" that a "company doctor" was a de facto or
shadow director.4' In reaching that conclusion, the court attached
particular weight to the monitoring of the company's trading and
binding authority, cases on the liability of shadow directors might provide useful
guidance to a court grappling with lender liability. See Deverell, [2000] 2 W.L.R. at
916-20.
33 In Hydrocam, [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. at 183, Millett J. said that in order to establish
shadow directorship, there should be a pattern of behavior in which the board of
directors does not exercise any discretion or judgment of its own but acts in accordance
with the directions of the shadow director. The Court of Appeal has recently stated that
although it must be shown that the board is accustomed to act on the directions or
instructions of the shadow director, it is not necessary for such directions or instructions
to extend over all or most of the activities of the company. See Deverell, [2000] 2
W.L.R. at 920.
34 Re a Company ex p Copp, [1989] B.C.L.C. 13.
35 Id. at 18.
36 Id. at 21.
37 Id. The issue arose on an application to strike out the claim. In order to reject
such an application, it was unnecessary for the judge to determine finally the merits of
the case.
38 In Re M.C. Bacon Ltd., [1990] B.C.C. 78, 79.
39 [1993] B.C.L.C. 297 (C.A.) (dismissing an appeal from the decision of Vinelott
J. [1991] B.C.L.C. 792).
40 Id. at 304. For the purpose of the application in that case, it was also unnecessary
for the Court to determine finally the merits of the claim. Id.
41 In Hydrocam, [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. at 183, Millett J. distinguished a shadow
director from a de facto director and defined the latter as someone who "is held out as a
director by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, although never
actually or validly appointed as such." However, in Deverell, [2000] 2 W.L.R. at 920,
Morritt L.J. refused to express a view as to whether the categories of de facto and
shadow director were mutually exclusive.
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the exercise of control of the company's bank account through the
bank mandate.42 Such control was real, not illusory: The "doctor"
refused to countersign salary checks and decided which creditors
should be paid and in what order.43
By comparing the position of a lender with that of a shadow
director, it may be argued that unless a lender has control over or
close involvement in the management of the borrower, a lender is
unlikely to be liable for "knowingly permitting." In particular, it is
suggested that it would be unreasonable for the courts to require a
lender to exercise control over the borrower by relying upon
covenants that were inserted into a loan agreement for a different
purpose, namely, to protect the lender's interests. However, in
order to minimize the risk of being found liable for "knowingly
permitting," a lender should avoid inserting any provision into a
loan agreement that confers power on the lender to enter the
borrower's property, to execute remedial work, and to pass on the
cost of such work to the borrower.
3. Causing or Knowingly Permitting the Contamination
of Land
Liability for causing or knowingly permitting pollution is also
imposed by the new contaminated land regime.' The mechanics
42 Re Tasbian (No.3), [1993] B.C.L.C. 297, 302-03.
43 Id. at 304.
44 The "old" contaminated land regime was set out in section 61 of the EPA 1990.
That regime set out provisions for the recovery of the costs of preventive measures from
the owner (who was not defined). However, the regime was never implemented and has
now been repealed. See Environment Act 1995, c. 25, sched. 22, T 79 (Eng.);
Environment Act 1995 (Commencement No. 16 and Saving Proyisions) Order, (2000) SI
2000/340 (Eng.).
The new regime came into force in England on 1 April 2000. See SI 2000/340; and
Contaminated Land (Eng.) Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/227. Local authorities were each
required to publish a strategy for the identification of contaminated land by July 2001.
The Environment Agency has estimated that in the United Kingdom more than 300,000
hectares of land covering between 5,000 and 20,000 "problem sites" may be
contaminated.
The regime is set out in sections 78A to 78YC of the EPA 1990, which were
inserted by section 57 of the EA 1995. See also Contaminated Land (Eng.) Regulations,
(2000) SI 2000/227, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 396-410;
Circular 02/2000 issued by the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions
[hereinafter the DETR Circular], reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at
411-558. The DETR Circular contains statutory guidance in Annex 3 [hereinafter the
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
of the regime will not be considered in detail here.45 In summary,
however, the new regime provides for the imposition of liability
for the remediation of contaminated land 46 (or the costs of
remediation) on the "appropriate person" or persons, who are
divided into two categories.47 The first comprises those persons
who have caused or knowingly permitted the substances by reason
of which the land is contaminated to be in, on or under the land
(referred to by the government as the "Class A liability group").48
The second category, comprising the owner or occupier for the
time being (and referred to by the government as the "Class B
liability group"), may be liable if, after reasonable inquiry, no
appropriate person in Class A can be found.49
Some assistance as to the scope of Class A liability may be
derived from statements made by the government during
parliamentary debates on the Environment Bill ("the Bill")50 and
from the DETR Circular.5 With regard to liability for "causing,"
Earl Ferrers referred to the decisions in Alphacel5 2 and Attorney-
General's Reference (No. 1 of 1994)3 and said:
[W]hether a lender could be held to have caused substances to
be in, on or under the land will depend on whether it took some
active participation in the operation or chain of operations
DETR Guidance], which is important for the detailed operation of the regime. THE NEW
REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 474-532.
45 For a detailed analysis of the new contaminated land regime, see THE NEW
REGIME, supra note 5.
46 Pursuant to section 78A(2) of the EPA 1990, contaminated land is defined as
any land which appears to the local authority ... to be in such a condition by
reason of substances in, on or under the land, that (a) significant harm is being
caused or there is a significant possibility of such harm being caused; or (b)
pollution of controlled waters is being, or is likely to be caused.
Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78A(2) (Eng.).
47 Id. § 78F(2), (4).
48 See DETR Guidance, D5, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D
at 505.
49 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78F(4) (Eng.).
50 565 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1497.
51 See DETR Circular, q 9.9, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5,
app. D at 451.
52 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
53 Id.
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resulting in those substances being in, on or under the land. The
act of lending per se does not amount to such active
participation.54
After the Bill received Royal Assent, the DETR Circular re-
stated the government's position: "[T]he test of 'causing' will
require that the person concerned was involved in some active
operation, or series of operations, to which the presence of the
pollutant is attributable. Such involvement may also take the form
of a failure to act in certain circumstances. 55
With regard to the definition of "knowingly permitting," the
government's view is that this would require "both knowledge56
that the substances in question were in, on or under the land57 and
the possession of the power to prevent such a substance being
there."58
More specifically, the government sought to comfort lenders
by suggesting that the second element of "knowingly permitting"
is (as has already been suggested above) 59 unlikely to be satisfied
because:
there is no judicial decision which supports the contention that a
lender, by virtue of the act of lending the money only, could be
said to have "knowingly permitted" the substances to be in, on
54 565 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1497.
55 DETR Circular, 9.9, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5,
app. D at 451.
56 The government stated that where an owner, occupier, or other appropriate
person is given notice (pursuant to § 78B(4) of the EPA 1990) that land is contaminated,
it would not give rise to the requisite knowledge (otherwise the distinction between
liability for knowingly permitting and liability as owner/occupier would be elided). See
DETR Circular, 9.13, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at
451. The same point has also been made in relation to consultation with the
owner/occupier pursuant to section 78H(l) of the EPA 1990 as to what shall be done by
way of remediation. See DETR Circular, 9.14, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME,
supra note 5, app. D at 451.
57 This is consistent with the language of section 78F(2) of the EPA 1990, which
makes clear that only knowledge of the deposit (rather than its contaminating nature or
potential) is required. See also Shanks & McEwan Teesside Ltd. v. Env't Agency,
[1999] Q.B. 333, 342-45 (Q.B. Div'l Ct 1997); Ashcroft v. Cambro, [1981] 1 W.L.R.
1349 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1981).
58 DETR Circular, [ 9.10, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5,
app. D at 451. See also 565 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1497 (citations added).
59 See supra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
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or under the land such that it is contaminated. This would be the
case if for no other reason than the lender, irrespective of any
covenants it might have required from the polluter as to its
environmental behaviour, would have no permissive rights over
the land in question to prevent contamination occurring or
continuing.6 °
However, the DETR Guidance relating to the exclusion of
appropriate persons from the Class A liability group (when there
are two or more such persons in that group) may send a confusing
message to lenders.61 The DETR Guidance provides that the
following are excluded activities: 62 (1) providing or withholding of
financial assistance by way of (inter alia) a loan or mortgage; 63 (2)
"carrying out action for the purpose of deciding whether or not to
provide such financial assistance;"' and (3) providing advice
(including legal and financial advice): in relation to acts/omissions
by reason of which the client has been held to have caused or
knowingly permitted the presence of the pollutant; 65 or for the
purpose of assessing the condition of the land;66 or "for the
purpose of establishing what might be done by way of
remediation."67
The DETR Guidance emphasizes that the existence of an
exclusion does not imply that the carrying out of the excluded
activity would be "causing or knowingly permitting., 68 However,
60 DETR Circular, 9.11, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5,
app. D at 451. See also 565 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1497.
61 This part of the DETR Guidance is made pursuant to section 78F(6) of the EPA
1990. See DETR Guidance, D40, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D
at 5 10.
62 DETR Guidance, D.48, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at
512-13.
63 Id. (see in particular paragraph D.48(a)).
64 Id. (see in particular paragraph D.48(c)). However, this exclusion will not assist
a lender who carries any "intrusive investigation ... [which] ... is itself a cause of the
existence of the significant pollutant linkage in question" where the person who applied
for the financial assistance is not also a member of the Class A liability group. Id.
65 Id. (see in particular paragraph D.48(i)(i)).
66 Id. (see in particular paragraph D.48(i)(ii)).
67 Id. (see in particular paragraph D.48(i)(iii)).
68 DETR Guidance, I D.47, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at
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lenders may derive limited comfort from this for three reasons.
First, the presence of the provisions at least appears to contemplate
the possibility that the activities identified could constitute causing
or knowingly permitting. Second, the exclusions will not apply if
the lender is the only appropriate person in Class A who can be
found.69 Third, the exclusions do not apply to activities that are
"associated" with those described in that paragraph.
Whatever message the foregoing provisions might convey to
lenders, it is submitted that the approach adopted by the English
courts under the new contaminated land regime should be similar
to the approach already discussed in relation to other statutory
regimes which impose liability for "causing or knowingly
permitting" pollution.7 °  Consequently, the provision or
withholding of finance is unlikely in itself to give rise to liability
for causing or knowingly permitting. However, the exercise of
control over the day-to-day management of the borrower may well
give rise to such liability.
4. An Alternative Approach: The "Person Responsible"
In contrast with the regimes referred to above, the statutory
nuisance regime in the EPA 1990 adopts different terminology.7"
The "person responsible" (who may be served with an abatement
notice)72 is defined as "the person to whose act, default or
sufferance the nuisance is attributable. 73 There will only be a
default, however, where there is an obligation 'under the legislation
to act.74 Although it has been suggested that "suffer" may have a
69 Such a situation might arise, for example, where the borrower is a company that
has been dissolved and struck off the register of companies. In certain circumstances,
however, a dissolution may subsequently be declared void or a dissolved company
restored to the register. See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 651, 653 (Eng.).
70 See supra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
71 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 79(7) (Eng.).
72 Id. § 80(2)(a). Pursuant to section 80(l)(a), such a notice may be served
"requiring the abatement of the nuisance or prohibiting or restricting its occurrence or
recurrence." The notice may also require the "execution of such works, and the taking of
such other steps as may be necessary for those purposes." Id. § 80(1)(b).
73 Id. § 79(7).
74 Neath Rural Dist. Council v. Williams, [1951] 1 K.B. 115, 126-27 (Div'l Ct.
1950).
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wider meaning than "permit, '75 the courts have tended to treat the
words as having a similar meaning.76 Therefore, the approach
adopted in the statutory nuisance regime in the EPA 1990 should
not present lenders with a greater risk of liability than the regimes
referred to above," which impose liability for "causing or
knowingly permitting" pollution.
B. Proprietary Liability
1. Liability as Owner
Not surprisingly, environmental liability regimes usually
impose liability upon the owner of land.78 However, there is no
uniform definition of owner. The meaning therefore depends upon
the particular common law or statutory regime and on the court's
view of the purpose and scope of that regime.
For example, an owner may be served with an abatement
notice regarding a statutory nuisance pursuant to section 80 of the
EPA 1990. 7' The EPA 1990 does not define "owner" for the
purpose of the statutory nuisance regime in general. However, a
definition is provided specifically for the part of the regime that
governs the recovery of abatement costs incurred by a local
75 Barton v. Reed, [1932] 1 Ch. 362, 375 (Ch. 1931).
76 See Berton v. Alliance Econ. Inv. Co., [1922] 1 K.B. 742, 759 (C.A.). See also
Reg. v. Staines Local Bd., 60 L.T.R. 261, 264 (1889).
77 See supra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
78 These include:
(1) the statutory nuisance regime in section 80 of the EPA 1990 (which is
discussed further below);
(2) the contaminated land regime (which is discussed infra notes 93-99 and
accompanying text); and
(3) nuisance at common law. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, V 19-57-19-60
(A.M. Dugdale et al. eds., 18th ed. 2000).
It should be observed that paragraph 89 of Schedule 22 of the EA 1995 provides that "no
matter shall constitute a statutory nuisance to the extent that it consists of or is caused by
any land being in a contaminated state." Environment Act, 1995, c. 25, 89(3), sched. 22
(Eng.). This is discussed further in paragraphs 59 to 63, Annex 1 of the DETR Circular,
reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 425.
79 Such a notice may be served on the owner where, for example, the person
responsible for the nuisance cannot be found or the nuisance has not yet occurred. See
Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 80(2)(c).
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authority as a charge on premises.80 For that purpose alone, section
81A(9) defines an "owner" as being:
in relation to any premises... a person (other than a mortgagee
not in possession) who, whether in his own right or as trustee for
any other person, is entitled to receive the rack rent of the
premises or, where the premises are not let at a rack rent, would
be so entitled if they were so let.8'
A mortgagee who is not in possession would not be an owner
for the purpose of that definition. On the other hand, it would be
consistent with the approach of the courts to the interpretation of
other statutory regimes if a mortgagee in possession were held to
be an "owner" for the purpose of section 81A(9) of the EPA 1990
and/or the statutory nuisance regime in general.8 2 Moreover, such a
mortgagee would appear to be at equal, if not greater, risk of being
found liable as an occupier for the reasons set out below.
2. Liability as Occupier
There are a number of regimes that impose environmental
liability on an occupier.83 However, the term is usually undefined.
80 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 81A(9).
81 In Camden LBC v. Gunby, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 465 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1999), the
Divisional Court held that the definition of "owner" for the purpose of section 80 of the
EPA 1990 was derived from the legislative history of statutory nuisance and was
different from section 81A(9). Gunby, [2000] 1 W.L.R. at 472. In the former provision,
the owner was "the person for the time being receiving the rackrent of the premises in
connection with which the word is used, whether on his own account or as agent or
trustee for any other person" (emphasis added). Gunby, [2000] 1 W.L.R. at 469. The
Divisional Court held in Midland Bank v. Conway, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1165, that mere
receipt of rent by the bank acting solely pursuant to its duty (in the banker-customer
relationship) to act as banker did not make the bank such an agent. Midland Bank, [1965]
1 W.L.R. at 1170.
82 See Maguire v. Leigh-on-Sea Urban Dist. Council, [1906] 95 L.T.R. 319, 321.
See also Westminster City Council v. Haymarket Pub'g Ltd., [1981] 1 W.L.R. 677, 680
(C.A.). Where the mortgagee gives notice to the tenants to pay the rent, the mortgagee
may be held to be in possession. See, e.g., Davies v. Law Mut. Bldg. Soc'y, 219 E.G.
309 (QB. Div'l Ct. 1971).
83 The term is used, for example, in the statutory nuisance regime, where the
occupier may (like the owner) be served with an abatement notice where the person
responsible for the nuisance cannot be found or the nuisance has not yet occurred. See
Environmental Protection Agency, 1990, § 80 (Eng.); in relation to waste removal
notices served pursuant to section 59 of the EPA 1990, which may require an occupier to
remove controlled waste (which has been deposited in contravention of section 33(1))
unless he can satisfy the court that he neither knowingly caused nor knowingly permitted
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For this reason, attention has sometimes been directed toward
authorities dealing with other statutory provisions. In the context
of liability pursuant to the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, 84 for
example, it has been held that the lawful assertion of a right to
enter and control premises coupled with the consequent vacation
of the property by the existing occupier is sufficient to give rise to
occupation.85
However, in Southern Water Authority v. Nature Conservancy
Council8 6 Lord Mustill warned against the use of authorities that
"draw their meaning entirely from the purpose for which and the
context in which they are used."87 In that case, his Lordship was
dealing with the meaning of occupier in section 28 of the Wildlife
and Countryside Act 1981 (as amended) which concerns the
regime relating to sites of special scientific interest. 88 Providing a
definition which was specific to the provisions of that regime,
Lord Mustill said that an occupier must "stand in such a
comprehensive and stable relationship with the land as to be, in
company with the actual owner, someone to whom the
mechanisms [of section 28] can sensibly be made to apply."'8 9
Although a mortgagee in possession is at risk of falling within
any definition of occupier,90 a mortgagee who is not in possession
is unlikely to fall within such a definition. The question is
therefore likely to turn upon when a mortgagee is deemed to be in
possession. It is suggested that where a mortgagee lawfully
demands possession, and as a result the mortgagor hands over the
the deposit; in the new contaminated land regime, see infra notes 93-96; and in nuisance
at common law. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, 19.54-19.55 (18th ed. 2000).
84 Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, c. 31 (Eng.).
85 See Harris v. Birkenhead, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 279, 287 (C.A.); see also Wheat v.
Lacon, [1996] AC 552 (P.C.) (regarding the significance of control over the premises);
Newcastle CC v. Royal Newcastle Hosp., [1959] A.C. 248, 255 (P.C.).
86 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 775 (H.L.).
87 Id. at 781.
88 Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, § 69 (Eng.).
89 S. Water Auth., [1992] 1 W.L.R. at 782.
90 At least one mortgagee in possession has been served with a waste removal
notice. See Devonshire WRA v. Roberts Warren & Snow, [1995] 7 Envtl. L. & Mgmt.
105 (where such a notice was served on Midland Bank PLC who had repossessed a
property previously used as a waste tire dump and the bank agreed to clean up the site
without appealing against the service of the notice).
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keys to the lender, or simply abandons the property,9 the lender is
at risk of being held to be in possession of the property.92
3. Liability of Owner/Occupier for Contaminated Land
Under the contaminated land regime, liability is imposed on
members of the Class B liability group, which comprises the
owner and/or the occupier, in the event that no member of the
Class A liability group93 can be found.
"Owner" is defined in section 78A(9) of the EPA as:
a person (other than a mortgagee not in possession) who,
whether in his own right or as a trustee for any other person, is
entitled to receive the rack rent of the land, or where the land is
not let at a rack rent, would be so entitled if it were so let.94
Banks have taken little comfort from the exclusion of
mortgagees not in possession from the definition of "owner."
During the passage of the Bill, concerns were debated in the
House of Lords regarding the potential liability of a mortgagee as
owner when a property is abandoned or the keys are returned and
the mortgagee simply enters the premises in order to secure
them.95 However, the government ultimately rejected these
concerns and refused to amend the Bill.96
There is, moreover, no definition of "occupier." It is suggested
that a mortgagee may be considered to be in possession and to be
liable as an occupier if it lawfully demands possession and as a
result the mortgagor simply hands in the keys to the mortgagee or
91 See Harris v. Birkenhead, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 279, 287 (C.A.).
92 But see Kirby v. Cowderoy, [1912] A.C. 599, 606 (P.C.) (in which it was stated
that what amounts to possession will depend on the circumstances of the case including
the character of the property).
93 The Class A liability group contains those who caused and/or knowingly
permitted the pollutant to be in, on, or under the land. See supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
94 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78A(9) (Eng.).
95 The point was made in relation to the proposed definition of owner (rather than
to the absence of a definition of occupier). See 560 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995)
1445. Examples that caused particular concern (because of the presence of potential
pollutants) included petrol stations and dry cleaning establishments. Id.
96 See 562 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1043. The reason given was that a
mortgagee in possession was already liable under existing regimes, for example, as an
occupier under the statutory nuisance regime.
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abandons the property.97 On the other hand, where the mortgagor
abandons possession without reference to any act of the mortgagee
or any agreement with the mortgagee, the latter is unlikely to be
held to be in possession or deemed to be an occupier of the
property by reason of the abandonment alone.9 8
Where there are two or more appropriate persons within a
Class B liability group, the government has provided two grounds
upon which a person may be excluded from the group. 99 However,
neither of those is likely to be of any relevance or assistance to
lenders or mortgagees.
4. Receivers
A receiver appointed pursuant to a lender's security may incur
liability as an occupier of premises.l°° A receiver is ordinarily an
agent of the mortgagor'' and so the mortgagee should not
normally incur any liability as a result.I12 However, if a mortgagee
interferes in the conduct of the receivership, the receiver may
become the agent of the lender and the lender may thereby become
97 See 562 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1041 (suggesting that thirty-five
percent of mortgage possessions in England are cases in which possession is voluntarily
given).
98 It is arguable that in such cases a mortgagee would not be in possession because
it had not taken "control and dominium" of the property. See Noyes v. Pollock, 32 Ch.
53, 62, 64-65 (Ch. 1886).
It should also be noted that the mortgagor who has voluntarily surrendered
possession of the property might still be served with a remediation notice. See
Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78G(1) (Eng.). In such a case, the mortgagee will
be obliged to permit the mortgagor to enter the property in order to comply with such a
notice. See Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78G(2) (Eng.).
99 See DETR Guidance, I D.89, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app.
D at 521-22.
100 See, e.g., Meigh v. Wickenden, [1942] 2 K.B. 160.
101 See Law of Property Act, 1925, c. 20, § 109(2) (Eng.), which provides that a
"receiver appointed by the powers conferred by this Act, or any other enactment replaced
by this Act, shall be deemed to be the agent of the mortgagor; and that the mortgagor
shall be solely responsible for the receiver's acts or defaults unless the mortgage deed
otherwise provides." See also Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 44(1)(a) (Eng.), which
provides that the administrative receiver of a company is deemed to be the company's
agent unless and until the company goes into liquidation. It is also common for security
documents to provide expressly that a receiver is deemed to be agent of the mortgagor.
102 A lender would incur liability, however, if the lender agreed to indemnify the
receiver in respect of the latter's liability.
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liable for the acts and omissions of the receiver.° 3 Consequently,
if the receiver is in occupation, the mortgagee might (by
interfering in the conduct of the receivership) similarly be held to
be in occupation. The basis for such a finding is that the receiver
was in occupation as agent of the mortgagee and/or that the
mortgagee (through the receiver) was exercising sufficient control
over the property.
It should be noted that receivers might benefit from the
provisions in the contaminated land regime which exclude from
liability persons "acting in a relevant capacity."' 0 4 This term is
defined to include not only a person acting as an insolvency
practitioner"°5 and the official receiver (acting as an insolvency
practitioner or as a receiver or manager), but also a person acting
as a receiver or manager by virtue of any enactment or an order of
court or any other instrument. However, such exclusions would
not apply insofar as the "presence [of a contaminating pollutant] is
a result of any act or omission made by him which it was
unreasonable for a person actingin that capacity to do or make."
' 10 6
The element of reasonableness raises difficult questions. In
particular, it is not clear whether, and if so, in what circumstances
and to what extent, an insolvency practitioner would be expected
to investigate for possible contamination. However, if a receiver
decides to carry on the business of the mortgagor on the premises,
the obligations imposed upon him will likely be greater. 107
5. Lender Acting as Trustee
The contaminated land regime raises a further important issue
relating to the potential liability of lenders. The definition of
"owner" in section 78A(9) of the EPA 1990 includes a trustee.'0 8
That definition is not limited by any requirement that the trustee
103 See Standard Chartered Bank v. Walker, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1410 (C.A.). See also
American Express v. Hurley, [1985] 3 All E.R. 564 (Q.B.).
104 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78X(3)-(4) (Eng.).
105 See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 388 (Eng.).
106 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78X(3)(a) (Eng.).
107 It may be useful to consider by analogy Medforth v. Blake, [2000] Ch. 86 (C.A.),
in which it was held that although the receiver is not obligated to carry on the business of
the mortgagor, if he does so he owes an equitable duty to the mortgagor to manage the
property with due diligence.
108 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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possess a beneficial interest in the land concerned or exercise any
control over the land. Although concerns were expressed about
this element of the definition in the debate on the Bill in the House
of Lords,'0 9 the government decided not to amend it." ° It should
also be noted that neither of the potential grounds of exclusion
from liability in the DETR Guidance were directed at or likely to
assist trustees.' "'
A lender acting as trustee is therefore clearly exposed to
potential liability as an owner under the contaminated land regime.
However, such a lender may derive some comfort from its
entitlement to be indemnified from the trust funds for the costs of
remediation work incurred in respect of contaminated land. 12 In
order to enforce that right, the lender trustee has a lien over the
trust funds in respect of such sums.' 1'
III.Potential Effect on Recovery
This section discusses the potential effect that pollution may
have on a lender's recovery from a borrower. There are three ways
in which pollution may affect a lender's security. The first (and
most obvious) is that the value or even the marketability of the
property may be affected. The second way is that if the borrower
is required to incur costs remedying pollution or contamination (or
to reimburse a public authority for the cost of remedial works),
this may affect the borrower's ability to repay the loan and reduce
the value of the borrower's covenant to do so. 1 14 The third manner
109 See 560 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1446; see also 562 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(5th ser.) (1995) 164.
110 See 562 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 166.
111 See THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 521 (which sets out the exclusions
in paragraph D.89 of the DETR Guidance).
112 See X v. A, [2000] 1 All E.R. 490 (Ch. 2000) (which implicitly recognizes the
right of indemnity).
113 See id. at 493-94.
114 If, for example, the Environment Agency seeks to recover from the borrower the
cost of anti-pollution works pursuant to section 161D of the WRA, such costs are
recoverable as a simple debt. Such a debt is not included in the special category of
"preferential debts" listed in the Insolvency Act. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Sched. 6
(Eng.). Therefore, if the borrower becomes insolvent and (in the case of an individual) is
made bankrupt or (in the case of a company) goes into liquidation, that debt will not take
priority over other unsecured debts of the borrower. Compare the position under other
regimes, discussed infra, in which the debt gives rise to a statutory charge and is
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in which a lender's security might be prejudicially affected results
from the potential imposition of a statutory charge." 5 Such a
charge may be imposed in a limited number of regimes such as the
contaminated land regime and the statutory nuisance regime. 116
In the contaminated land regime, for example, where an
enforcing authority carries out:,remediation work in respect of
contamination arising from the owner having caused or knowingly
permitted the pollutant to be in, on or under the land, the costs of
such work and interest thereon shall be a charge on the
premises. 17 The intention of the statute would appear to be that
such a charge would take priority over a lender's pre-existing
security." 8 There are two matters that support this view. First, and
most importantly, other statutes with language similar to the
provisions have been held to have such an effect." 9 Second, this
view is consistent with the requirement that a charging notice is
served not just on the owner, but on "every other person who, to
the knowledge of the authority has an interest in the premises
capable of being affected by the charge."'
120
therefore secured.
115 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78P (Eng.) (contaminated land);
Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 81 (Eng.) (statutory nuisance).
116 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, §§ 78P, 81 (Eng.). On the other hand, the
cost of anti-pollution works, which may be recovered by a local authority pursuant to
section 161D of the WRA, is only recoverable as a simple debt. See supra note 114.
117 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, §§ 78P(4), 78P(7) (Eng.). An enforcing
authority has (for the purpose of enforcing the charge) "all the powers and remedies"
which it would have under the Law of Property Act, 1925, and otherwise, "as if it were a
mortgagee by deed having powers of sale and lease, of accepting surrenders of leases
and of appointing a receiver." Id. § 78P(1 1).
118 Where the effect of giving priority to the statutory charge would be to deprive a
lender of its security, the lender might argue that this gives rise to an interference with its
property rights in breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention
on Human Rights (which was incorporated into English domestic law by the Human
Rights Act, 1998 with effect from 2 October 2000). However, the protection conferred
by this provision is not absolute and interference may often be justified by the
circumstances. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON,' THE LAW OF HUMAN
RIGH-TS U 18.64-18.81 (2000).
119 See Westminster City Council v. Haymarket Pub'g Ltd., [1981] 1 W.L.R. 677,
680-82 (C.A.) (in which the court held that a charge on land in respect of a rating
surcharge took priority over a mortgage debt).
120 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78P(6) (Eng.).
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IV. Steps to Protect Lender's Position
This section describes the steps a lender might take in order to
insulate itself as far as possible from potential environmental
liabilities. The discussion is merely intended to provide some
general guidance and does not purport to be exhaustive. Before
proceeding with any, transaction, a prudent lender should, of
course, seek specialist legal advice that has been tailored to the
circumstances of the case.
For comprehensive protection, the position of the lender
requires careful consideration at all stages, particularly when (1)
preliminary inquiries are made prior to the provision of any
finance, (2) loan and security documentation are drafted, and (3)
enforcement and, in particular, repossession of the property are
required. Each of these stages will be considered in turn.
A. Preliminary Inquiries
A lender's evaluation of the risk of potential environmental
liabilities should involve an assessment of the past as well as the
future. With regard to the past, a, potential lender should consider
both the history of the site and any consequent risk of pollution
and the history of the borrower's conduct, including previous
convictions. As to the future, the lender should consider the risks
of pollution arising from the activities that the borrower intends to
carry out on the site.
An evaluation may take place in two phases or stages. The first
phase is a desktop analysis of information provided both by the
borrower and independently of the borrower. This evaluation is
particularly important where the lender proposes to take security
over the land or premises of the borrower. 121
General inquiries should include whether the borrower has
been a defendant in civil or criminal proceedings in connection
with its business activities, the use of its property, or for breach of
environmental laws or regulations. Inquiries relating to the
contaminated land regime"' might include: (1) whether the
121 See supra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
122 Other basic inquiries directed at other regimes might include: (a) whether the
borrower carries on or intends to carry on any activity requiring an authorization under
section 6 of the EPA 1990, a waste management license under section 35 of the EPA
1990, or a discharge consent, and (b) whether any existing or anticipated funds in the
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borrower owns or occupies any land which has been identified as
contaminated land, (2) whether it has been consulted by an
enforcing authority regarding a proposed remediation notice, (3)
whether it has been served with a remediation notice, (4) whether
it has been served with a charging notice, (5) whether it has been
or is being prosecuted for failure to comply with a remediation
notice, (6) whether it has reason to believe that any of the
foregoing might occur at any time in the future, and (7) whether it
intends to acquire or to occupy any land in respect of which any of
the foregoing questions would be answered in the affirmative. 12 3
An affirmative answer to any of these questions may indicate
that further inquiries are required regarding either the condition of
any site or the past, present, or intended activities of the lender.
Consideration should also be given to (1) any evidence of the
prior use of the site derived from maps (including, where
appropriate, Ordnance Survey, 24 geological, and hydro-geological
maps) and from previous regulatory approval (in the form of
permits, authorizations, licenses, consents, and planning
permissions), and (2) any evidence of prior infringements of
environmental laws (such as statutory charges, abatement notices,
and previous convictions), whether such infringements involve the
borrower or any property owned by the borrower.
Further sources of information for this desktop analysis are the
contaminated land registers, which are maintained by enforcing
authorities pursuant to the provisions of the contaminated land
regime. 125 These registers contain information relating to (inter
alia) remediation notices, 126  remediation statements and
declarations, 12 appeals against charging notices, 12' notices given
hands of the borrower are already committed, for example, to the restoration of land used
as a waste disposal site.
123 The request should be broad enoughto include the acquisition of any business
that owns or occupies any such land.
124 Ordnance Survey is an executive agency responsible for national mapping in
Britain.
125 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78R (Eng.). Such registers are open to
public inspection. Id. § 78R(8).
126 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 78R(l)(a) (Eng.).
127 Id. § 78R(l)(c).
128 Id. § 78R(1)(d). However, the contaminated land regime does. not provide for the
registration of the charging notice itself.
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by appropriate persons of what they claim has been done on the
site by way of remediation, 129 and convictions for offenses for
failing to comply with a remediation notice.13 ° Although such
inquiries provide useful information for a lender who is seeking to
assess the risks of environmental liabilities, such inquiries cannot
guarantee a clean bill of health.131 It may therefore be necessary to
carry out a second phase of inquiry involving the further
investigations discussed below. 132
Important questions might be asked in a local search such as
whether the local authority has inspected the land, and, if so, the
details of any site investigation reports, 133 whether the local
authority has carried out or intends to carry out a consultation
regarding the proposed service of a remediation notice, and
whether a charging notice has been served. 134 The last point is
particularly important because the contaminated land regime does
not provide for the registration of charging notices.135
The second phase of the evaluation of the risks of
129 Id. § 78R(1)(h)-(j). It should be noted that no such entry shall constitute a
representation by the body maintaining the register that the work stated to have been
done has in fact been done or as to the manner in which it has been done. Id. § 78R(3).
130 Id. § 78R(1)(k); see also id. § 78M.
131 See supra note 12 7. Moreover, pursuant to sections 78S and 78T of the EPA
1990, information may be excluded from the register on the grounds of national security
and commercial confidentiality respectively. See also DETR Circular, 17.8-17.9,
Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 467.
132 See discussion infra Part IV(B).
133 See DETR Circular, 3.38, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note
5, app. D at 435. This suggests that such inquiries might be made in relation to land that
has not been identified as contaminated. Paragraph 3.39 Annex 2 of the DETR Circular
also acknowledges that the authority may be obliged to provide information pursuant to
the Environment Information Regulations (1992) SI 1992/3240, as amended. Id. See also
R v. British Coal Corp. exparte Ibstock, [1995] Env. L.R. 277 (Q.B., 1994) (interpreting
these regulations).
134 As a result of the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights
by the Human Rights Act 1998 (which requires public authorities to act compatibly with
Convention rights), it might also be possible to invoke Article 10 of the Convention. This
may require the government to make available to the public information on
environmental matters, although it does not impose a positive obligation on States to
collect, process and disseminate such information. See Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R.
357, 52-53 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1998).
135 See DETR Circular, 16.9, Annex 2, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note
5, app. D at 465.
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environmental liability should involve on-site physical
investigations. Such investigations are normally carried out once
the potential pollutants or sources of contamination have been
identified. Specialist environmental consultants should be engaged
to carry out such investigations and to prepare a report. Prior to the
engagement of such consultants, there should be a clear agreement
between the lender and the borrower as to who is to engage the
consultant, who is to bear the risks (including the cost of
insurance), and who is to bear the costs of making good after such
investigations have been carried out. 36 The report should contain
an express acknowledgement that it is being prepared for the
purpose of providing information to enable the named lender to
decide whether to provide financial assistance to the borrower
(and to secure the facilities on the relevant property) and that the
report can be relied upon by the lender for this purpose. 137 The
report should also state what tests were carried out, by whom they
were carried oUt, 138 and what equipment was used. Finally, the
results of the tests should be presented clearly, and any
assumptions or standards relied upon in order to assess those
results should be fully explained.
B. Drafting Loan and Security Documentation
In addition to the preliminary inquiries mentioned above, the
lender should also take steps to protect itself when the loan and
security documents are being drafted.
The loan agreement should contain warranties relating to the
information and responses to basic inquiries provided by the
borrower regarding the condition of the property. Covenants
should also be inserted as to (1) the nature and extent of the
136 It is suggested that the safest course would be to require the borrower to engage
and pay for the consultants.
137 Such a provision would assist a lender in the event that it wishes to bring an
action in negligence against a consultant who was engaged by the borrower. If, however,
the lender wishes to obtain contractual rights against the consultant, the lender should
consider purchasing from the consultant a further copy of the report to be addressed to
the lender or obtaining a collateral warranty.
138 Although the required qualifications and, if possible, the identity of the
consultant should be agreed to beforehand by the borrower and the lender, the report
should also state the qualifications possessed by all those involved in carrying out such
tests or contributing to the report.
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activities which the borrower intends to carry out on the site, (2)
compliance with environmental laws and regulations, (3) the
procurement and maintenance by the borrower of adequate
insurance against environmental liabilities, and (4) the reporting of
any changes which might affect the matters warranted by the
borrower.
The lender can further protect itself in several ways. First, the
lender should be given the right to demand information and to
inspect documents relating to environmental compliance. Second,
the loan could also require the borrower to bear all remediation
costs and associated expenses.' 39 Third, the loan could further
provide that the borrower will indemnify the lender against any
environmental liability incurred by the lender in connection with
the loan, any security for the loan, or any activity of the borrower.
In addition, the borrower's breach of environmental laws or
regulations 40 could be made an event of default permitting the
lender to demand early repayment. The identification of relevant
land as contaminated or the service of a remediation notice could
also constitute an event of default. In some cases, lenders may
wish to provide for remedies that are not as severe as making
demand for repayment of the whole of any loan or other facility.
In such cases, partial acceleration clauses (making only part of a
loan repayable on demand) should be considered. Other possible
approaches include a discount in interest rates in the event of
compliance with environmental laws or an increase in interest rate
in the event of default.
It is submitted that the approaches referred to in the previous
paragraph are preferable to provisions which permit the lender to
139 In the contaminated land regime, where a copy of such an agreement has been
provided to the enforcing authority, the authority should generally make determinations
on exclusion, apportionment and attribution of liability in accordance with its provisions.
See DETR Guidance, D.38, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 510.
However, the agreement will be disregarded where it would increase the share of costs
theoretically to be borne by a person who would benefit from a limitation of recovery on
hardship grounds pursuant to section 78P(2) of the EPA 1990. See DETR Guidance, I
D.39, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 510. Such hardship includes
the threat of closure or insolvency of small or medium-sized enterprises. See DETR
Guidance, E.21-26, reprinted in THE NEW REGIME, supra note 5, app. D at 528.
140 This should include breaches of environmental laws which took place prior to
the date of the loan, but which (for whatever reason) were not disclosed by the borrower
to the lender.
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take steps to prevent or to remedy any breach of environmental
laws and to pass on the costs of any such steps to the borrower.
Such provisions should be avoided in order to prevent any claim
that the lender had the power to prevent or remedy pollution but
unreasonably failed to exercise that power.141
The lender should also take steps to protect itself when any
security documents are being drafted. Such documents should
reflect, insofar as it is appropriate, the provisions in the loan
agreements referred to above. In addition, the usual clause should
provide that in the event that a receiver is appointed, he is to be the
agent of the borrower/mortgagor (not the lender/mortgagee). 42
Finally, security documents should provide that any costs incurred
or payable by the lender in respect of remediation work, any
associated expenses, and any other sums payable under the
borrower's indemnity to the lender are fully secured.
C. Enforcement of the Loan and Repossession of Property
Making demand for repayment is not in itself likely to result in
additional liabilities being imposed on the lender. 43 However, the
lender is at risk of such liabilities if he takes possession of his
security. He will be at risk in the event that he asserts his right to
possession if, following such an assertion, the borrower hands
over the keys of the property to the lender or voluntarily abandons
the property. 44 Prior to seeking possession of any property, the
lender should therefore consider whether a further environmental
survey should be carried out.
The appointment of a receiver is likely to be a safer course for
a lender than taking possession as a mortgagee. However, such a
lender should ensure that it does not interfere in the conduct of the
receivership (otherwise it might still find itself liable for the acts
or omissions of the receiver). 145
V. Conclusion
In the absence of a developed body of English case law on
141 See discussion supra Part I (a).
142 See discussion supra Part I (B)(iv).
143 See discussion supra Part I (B)(ii).
144 See discussion supra Part I (B)(i)-(iii).
145 See discussion supra Part I (B)(iv).
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lender liability, it is difficult to state with certainty when such
liability may be incurred. It is unlikely that a lender would be
saddled with participatory liability, that is, liability that is imposed
for causing or knowingly permitting pollution or on similar
grounds.'46 Such liability should not result from the mere provision
or withholding of financial assistance by a lender. However, where
the lender exercises control over the management of the borrower
(and in particular, the operational activities of the borrower), it
may well incur environmental liability on the grounds that it has
participated, either by its acts or omissions in the polluting
conduct of the borrower.'47 Liability imposed on this basis would
be consistent with both the approach recommended by the
Commission of the European Communities in its proposals for an
environmental liability regime'48 and with recent legislative'49 and
146 See discussion supra Part I.
147 See discussion supra Part I.
148 In its White Paper on Environmental Liability, the Commission of the European
Communities proposed that "[l]enders not exercising operational control should not be
liable." White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM(2000) 66 final 4.4. It is
currently anticipated that a draft framework directive will be prepared towards the end of
2001. Compare Council Directive 96/61, art. 2(12), 2000 O.J. (C 375) (defining
"operator" as "any natural or legal person who operates or controls the installation or,
where this is provided for in national legislation, to whom decisive economic power over
the technical functioning of the installation has been delegated"), with Pollution
Prevention and Control Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/1973, T 2(1) (implementing Council
Directive 96/61/EC and defining "operator" as "the person who has control over [the]
operation" of an installation, while not expressly referring to decisive economic power).
149 The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
of 1996 amended the secured creditor exemption by defining impermissible participation
in management to require actual involvement with the management and operation of the
facility and not merely having the capacity to influence or the unexercised right of
control facility operations. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)-(F) (1998). While the borrower
remains in possession, a secured creditor will only be deemed to have impermissibly
participated in management where it:
exercises decision-making control over environmental compliance matters of
the facility to the extent that it has assumed responsibility for hazardous
substance management; or exercises control similar to that of a facility manager
over a) day-to-day environmental compliance decision-making, or b) all or
substantially all of the facility's operational functions (as distinguished from
financial or administrative functions) other than those related to environmental
compliance.
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judicial 5 ' developments in the United States.
Proprietary liability, that is, liability imposed on the owner or
occupier of property, is unlikely to be incurred by a mortgagee
who is not in possession of the property. On the other hand, a
mortgagee in possession may well be subject to such liability. A
mortgagee will therefore be at risk where it lawfully asserts its
right to possession and as a result the mortgagor voluntarily hands
over the keys to the lender and/or abandons the property. 5'
It is suggested that there are four points which lenders should
bear in mind in order to reduce the risk of liability being incurred
on either of the grounds discussed. First, a lender should ensure
that sufficient inquiries and investigations into actual and potential
contamination are carried out before agreeing to provide financial
assistance, particularly where the lender intends to secure the loan.
Second, a lender should encourage and require compliance with
environmental laws and regulations by the borrower. Third, a
lender should ensure that it does not become intimately involved
in the management of the borrower and, in particular, of its day-to-
day operations. Fourth, a lender should think carefully before
seeking to obtain possession of a property. Where there is a
material risk of pollution or contamination, a lender should
consider whether it wishes to examine an up-to-date
environmental report before proceeding further.
If sufficient care is exercised in the manner described above,
the development of a body of English case law on lender liability
may be far less likely to occur. If lessons can be learned from the
ebb and flow of lender liability in the United States, it is possible
that (in England, at least) the tide may never come in.
150 See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (discussing the liability
under CERCLA of a parent company for the costs of cleaning up waste generated at the
facility of a subsidiary). In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court held that in order to "sharpen
the definition for the purposes of CERCLA's concern with environmental contamination,
an operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution,
that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations." Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66.
151 Compare the position of a lender who forecloses in the United States. Such a
lender will not be held liable as an "owner or operator" if it seeks to sell or divest itself
of the property "at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on
commercially reasonable terms, taking into account market conditions and legal and
regulatory requirements." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii). In this respect, a lender in
England appears to be in a worse position than a lender in the United States.

